http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/OP24.pdf - Realising effective and sustainable democratic governance in Southern Africa and beyond/ Mauritius Electoral Reform Process by L. Amedee Darga
Report of the Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Reform 2001/1, Sachs Commission:http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/pmo/file/reform.doc
Parties receive no public funding in Mauritius (Lodge et al 2002, 180). The Sachs Commission Report (2001, 67) proposed that public funding of parties be adopted and attached a draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill to the Report. The National Assembly appointed a Select Committee on the Funding of Political Parties to review the proposals which issued a report in October 2004 that did not support public funding (Bunwaree & Kasenally 2005, 15, 30-31). The Government created a Cabinet Committee to review both reports in November 2004 but failed to submit its findings before the 2005 elections, which the government lost (Prime Minister's Office 2004).
PUBLIC FUNDING FOR AND THE REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES Term of Reference (c) requests the Commission to - "propose a draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill"
156. We attach the text of a proposed draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill as Annexure C. Normally, basic political decisions are taken about a measure and then draft legislation is elaborated. We have been invited to reverse the process, that is, to draft a Bill so as to provoke focussed political discussion. In accepting the challenge we wish to underline that the draft Bill which we annexe is based on a set of assumptions which we would support without necessarily being opposed to other approaches as to what the proper scope and structure of such a Bill should be. We do not offer what we consider to be a definitive text, but put forward a scheme which we regard as sufficiently coherent and motivated to serve as the basis for further elaboration.
157. In line with our terms of reference, we recommend the adoption of a law which would provide for the establishment of a Fund which will receive funds appropriated by Parliament and such other funds which it may lawfully received. Such funds will be administered by the Electoral Supervisory Commission, which shall allocate moneys –
(a) to political parties represented in the National Assembly on the basis of – (i) the number of members it has in the Assembly; (ii) the percentage of votes cast in favour of its candidates; and (iii) takes account of the number of women it has in the Assembly;
(b) to elected candidates and those who although not elected have at an election scored 15% or more of the votes expressed in their respective constituency; and
(c) before the election, to those parties which field in the 20 constituencies of Mauritius, 60 candidates, at least 20 of whom are women.
However, we do have certain qualms about having this common fund as the sole avenue for the financing of political parties for the following reasons: (a) The Sachs Report limits the application of the fund in the manner set out at paragraph 1.1.2.1 in the sense that only registered parties represented in the National Assembly and the candidate having scored more than 15% at an election would benefit from the Fund. The limitative application of the Fund may result in two outcomes which we deem would do injustice to the whole electoral process. Firstly, the strict application of the funding mechanism recommended by the Sachs Report would mean that essentially major political parties would benefit from the Fund, thus denying emerging political parties the opportunity for development. This may lead to a ‘natural selection’ process taking place in the political arena and resulting in the ‘ossification’ of older political parties which have been in power for a long time. In other words, there will be little or no possibility of turn over of political parties sitting 11 in the National Assembly as a result of this. Reform of the Select Committee on the Funding of Political Parties: The reader will certainly appreciate how vital the ease of turn over of political parties in power is in a dynamic democracy. (b) The creation of a common pool of funds would also mean that private contributors to the Fund might find themselves in the awkward position of financing a political party, the ideologies of which they do not espouse or are repugnant to their own.
After carrying out a balancing exercise, Your Committee is of the opinion that the creation of a Political Activities Public Financing Fund might not be the most appropriate step towards reshaping the structure of political financing in Mauritius.
At the request of the Select Committee, the Central Statistics Office has carried out an exercise to estimate the costs borne by candidates in 2000 and the costs expected to be borne by candidates in 2005. At the outset, it has to be stressed that the object of this exercise was not to criminalise conduct but to foster transparency. The results of the exercise (set out at Appendix 5) show that the estimated mean expenditure in 2000 was Rs. 633,700 and the expected mean expenditure in 2005 will be around Rs. 1,000,000. In the light of the exercise of the Central Statistics Office, the Select Committee is of the opinion that the spending limit should be set at a more realistic ceiling in order to remove the perception that such ceiling is observed only in their breach. The spending limit at a general election should accordingly be set uniformly at Rs. 1,000,000 for individual candidates as well as candidates forming part of a political party. It must further be made possible to revise this figure by way of regulations. The Select Committee is also of the opinion that a distinction has to be drawn between campaign and non-campaign (i.e. expenses not related to any actual election) expenditure and that those terms ought to be carefully defined in legislation dealing with political funding.
2.3.2 The arguments in favour of state funding The main argument in favour of state funding is that such a form of funding will ‘purify’ the political process (in the words of the Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life6) as it will discourage political parties from relying on large donors in order to raise funds. A second argument in favour of state funding is that it creates a level playing field as between political parties, initially at least, as it will enable political parties to run their basic activities more fully and effectively.
2.3.3 The arguments against state funding The most objectionable result of state funding is that the taxpayer will find himself financing political parties and causes which he does not necessarily support. A second argument against state funding is that the level playing field that it initially purports to create can disappear with the passage of time as the older parties having been ‘fed’ on state funds for years will have acquired a sound organisational structure while emerging parties will find it difficult to keep up with that trend. This is especially true in a system where the level of state funding is dependent on the proportion of votes received at previous elections. A third argument running alongside the previous one would be that a system of state funding which is not properly regulated may lead to an over-proliferation of political parties. A fourth argument is that the state might eventually ‘capture’ political parties (in the words of the Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life7), meaning that a political party may end up eventually representing the interests of the state which is funding its operations as opposed to representing the interests of the people who have elected it. A fifth argument which might be considered very relevant especially within the Mauritian context is the impact and strain that state funding might place on the national budget.
2.4. Funding by companies and pressure groups From the representations we have received from the public, it appears that the idea of funding by companies and pressure groups is repugnant to the public inasmuch as there is a widespread perception that such organisations have ulterior motives. However, as we have pointed out in our introduction, it is not the funding of political parties as much as the manner in which the funding is carried out that needs to be monitored and controlled. It is thus 19 our view that such organisations can legitimately fund political parties provided:- (a) there is adequate disclosure; and (b) a regulator be given sufficient power to intervene where there is a real risk that political parties are being funded with ulterior motives.
http://www.idea.int/parties/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=12479 Country Report based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties
Ethnic politics is an important determinant of coalition politics on the island. While most major political parties project themselves as national formations that cut across all ethnic groups, the reality on the ground is that most of them draw t heir support from clearly identifiable segments of the population. Empirically this translates into parties having safe seats in constituencies where one particular ethnic group is in majority and it throws its support behind them
For instance in the last election held in 2000, the major parties had two coalition possibilities one month before polling. The outgoing Labour Party Govt believed that it would be a three cornered fight which it could win easily with around 40 % of votes. Especially as the other two parties had just split and were criticising each other. However at the last minute ( basically on the eve of nomination day), realising that they would lose by splitting their votes, the MMM and the MSM came together and formed a coalition. They fielded joint candidates, captured 51 % of the votes and grabbed 90 % of the seats. Another electoral system would have probably led to the adoption of different strategies. Under a PR system, each party would have contested the election under its own independent banner. And bargaining and negotiation would have taken place after polling as it exists in many countries with PR model. For a long time, the MMM proposed to add a dose of PR to the current FPTP formula. A Constitutional Commission was appointed by Govt in 2001 to consider electoral reforms. The Commission has proposed a mixed electoral system with 30 PR seats while keeping the current 70 FPTP MPs. However no decision has yet been taken to modify the electoral system. It is clear that a new electoral formula would change the behaviour and strategies of political parties.
A political vacuum was created as the two main political parties that had contested the Independence election of 1967 formed a coalition in 1969.This was effectively occupied by a radical left wing party (MMM) that embraced a very nationalistic and an ethnic free platform. As it was new and had never participated in an election, nobody could gauge its real electoral force. When the LP/PMSD coalition of 1969 eventually collapsed, the two parties contested the 1976 General Elections separately. However they had to face the daunting challenge of the MMM. We thus have a unique situation where an election was fought by three major parties without a pre election coalition. It was the relative uncertainty of the strength of the MMM that led to such a predicament.The election produced a hung parliament with the new party, the MMM, capturing 34 of the 70 seats. The other two main parties won 36 seats between them ( 28 for the LP and 6 for the PMSD).
16 comments:
http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/OP24.pdf - Realising effective and sustainable democratic governance in Southern Africa and beyond/ Mauritius Electoral Reform Process by L. Amedee Darga
Report of the Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Reform 2001/1, Sachs Commission:http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/pmo/file/reform.doc
Public funding
Parties receive no public funding in Mauritius (Lodge et al 2002, 180). The Sachs Commission Report (2001, 67) proposed that public funding of parties be adopted and attached a draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill to the Report. The National Assembly appointed a Select Committee on the Funding of Political Parties to review the proposals which issued a report in October 2004 that did not support public funding (Bunwaree & Kasenally 2005, 15, 30-31). The Government created a Cabinet Committee to review both reports in November 2004 but failed to submit its findings before the 2005 elections, which the government lost (Prime Minister's Office 2004).
PUBLIC FUNDING FOR AND THE REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Term of Reference (c) requests the Commission to -
"propose a draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill"
156. We attach the text of a proposed draft Public Funding of Political Parties Bill as Annexure C. Normally, basic political decisions are taken about a measure and then draft legislation is elaborated. We have been invited to reverse the process, that is, to draft a Bill so as to provoke focussed political discussion. In accepting the challenge we wish to underline that the draft Bill which we annexe is based on a set of assumptions which we would support without necessarily being opposed to other approaches as to what the proper scope and structure of such a Bill should be. We do not offer what we consider to be a definitive text, but put forward a scheme which we regard as sufficiently coherent and motivated to serve as the basis for further elaboration.
157. In line with our terms of reference, we recommend the adoption of a law which would provide for the establishment of a Fund which will receive funds appropriated by Parliament and such other funds which it may lawfully received. Such funds will be administered by the Electoral Supervisory Commission, which shall allocate moneys –
(a) to political parties represented in the National Assembly on the basis of –
(i) the number of members it has in the Assembly;
(ii) the percentage of votes cast in favour of its candidates; and
(iii) takes account of the number of women it has in the Assembly;
(b) to elected candidates and those who although not elected have at an election scored 15% or more of the votes expressed in their respective constituency; and
(c) before the election, to those parties which field in the 20 constituencies of Mauritius, 60 candidates, at least 20 of whom are women.
http://encountermauritius.gov.mu/portal/goc/assemblysite/file/finalrep.pdf
However, we do have certain qualms about having this common fund as the sole avenue for the financing of political parties for the following reasons:
(a) The Sachs Report limits the application of the fund in the manner set out at paragraph 1.1.2.1 in the sense that only registered parties represented in the National Assembly and the candidate having scored more than 15% at an election would benefit from the Fund. The limitative application of the Fund may result in two outcomes which we deem would do injustice to the whole electoral process. Firstly, the strict application of the funding mechanism recommended by the Sachs Report would mean that essentially major political parties would benefit from the Fund, thus denying emerging political parties the opportunity for development. This may lead to a ‘natural selection’ process taking place in the political arena and resulting in the ‘ossification’ of older political parties which have been in power for a long time. In other words, there will be little or no possibility of turn over of political parties sitting
11
in the National Assembly as a result of this. Reform of the Select Committee on the Funding of Political Parties: The reader will certainly appreciate how vital the ease of turn over of political parties in power is in a dynamic democracy.
(b) The creation of a common pool of funds would also mean that private contributors to the Fund might find themselves in the awkward position of financing a political party, the ideologies of which they do not espouse or are repugnant to their own.
After carrying out a balancing exercise, Your Committee is of the opinion that the creation of a Political Activities Public Financing Fund might not be the most appropriate step towards reshaping the structure of political financing in Mauritius.
At the request of the Select Committee, the Central Statistics Office has carried out an exercise to estimate the costs borne by candidates in 2000 and the costs expected to be borne by candidates in 2005. At the outset, it has to be stressed that the object of this exercise was not to criminalise conduct but to foster transparency. The results of the exercise (set out at Appendix 5) show that the estimated mean expenditure in 2000 was Rs. 633,700 and the expected mean expenditure in 2005 will be around Rs. 1,000,000. In the light of the exercise of the Central Statistics Office, the Select Committee is of the opinion that the spending limit should be set at a more realistic ceiling in order to remove the perception that such ceiling is observed only in their breach. The spending limit at a general election should accordingly be set uniformly at Rs. 1,000,000 for individual candidates as well as candidates forming part of a political party. It must further be made possible to revise this figure by way of regulations.
The Select Committee is also of the opinion that a distinction has to be drawn between campaign and non-campaign (i.e. expenses not related to any actual election) expenditure and that those terms ought to be carefully defined in legislation dealing with political funding.
2.3.2 The arguments in favour of state funding
The main argument in favour of state funding is that such a form of funding will ‘purify’ the political process (in the words of the Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life6) as it will discourage political parties from relying on large donors in order to raise funds.
A second argument in favour of state funding is that it creates a level playing field as between political parties, initially at least, as it will enable political parties to run their basic activities more fully and effectively.
2.3.3 The arguments against state funding
The most objectionable result of state funding is that the taxpayer will find himself financing political parties and causes which he does not necessarily support.
A second argument against state funding is that the level playing field that it initially purports to create can disappear with the passage of time as the older parties having been ‘fed’ on state funds for years will have acquired a sound organisational structure while emerging parties will find it difficult to keep up with that trend. This is especially true in a system where the level of state funding is dependent on the proportion of votes received at previous elections.
A third argument running alongside the previous one would be that a system of state funding which is not properly regulated may lead to an over-proliferation of political parties.
A fourth argument is that the state might eventually ‘capture’ political parties (in the words of the Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life7), meaning that a political party may end up eventually representing the interests of the state which is funding its operations as opposed to representing the interests of the people who have elected it.
A fifth argument which might be considered very relevant especially within the Mauritian context is the impact and strain that state funding might place on the national budget.
2.4. Funding by companies and pressure groups
From the representations we have received from the public, it appears that the idea of funding by companies and pressure groups is repugnant to the public inasmuch as there is a widespread perception that such organisations have ulterior motives. However, as we have pointed out in our introduction, it is not the funding of political parties as much as the manner in which the funding is carried out that needs to be monitored and controlled. It is thus
19
our view that such organisations can legitimately fund political parties provided:-
(a) there is adequate disclosure; and
(b) a regulator be given sufficient power to intervene where there is a real risk that political parties are being funded with ulterior motives.
http://www.idea.int/parties/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=12479 Country Report based on Research and Dialogue with
Political Parties
Report on Proportional Representation: http://encountermauritius.gov.mu/portal/goc/assemblysite/file/Report%20on%20Proportional%20Representation.pdf
http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/parties-and-candidates/mauritius.pdf
Coalition politics under the tropics: office seekers, power
makers, nation building
A case study of Mauritius
By Ramakrishna Sithanen
Ethnic politics is an important determinant of coalition politics on
the island. While most major political parties project themselves
as national formations that cut across all ethnic groups, the
reality on the ground is that most of them draw t heir support from
clearly identifiable segments of the population. Empirically this
translates into parties having safe seats in constituencies where
one particular ethnic group is in majority and it throws its support
behind them
For instance in the last election held in
2000, the major parties had two coalition possibilities one month before
polling. The outgoing Labour Party Govt believed that it would be a three
cornered fight which it could win easily with around 40 % of votes.
Especially as the other two parties had just split and were criticising each
other. However at the last minute ( basically on the eve of nomination
day), realising that they would lose by splitting their votes, the MMM and
the MSM came together and formed a coalition. They fielded joint
candidates, captured 51 % of the votes and grabbed 90 % of the seats.
Another electoral system would have probably led to the adoption of
different strategies. Under a PR system, each party would have contested
the election under its own independent banner. And bargaining and
negotiation would have taken place after polling as it exists in many
countries with PR model. For a long time, the MMM proposed to add a
dose of PR to the current FPTP formula. A Constitutional Commission was
appointed by Govt in 2001 to consider electoral reforms. The Commission
has proposed a mixed electoral system with 30 PR seats while keeping the
current 70 FPTP MPs. However no decision has yet been taken to modify
the electoral system. It is clear that a new electoral formula would
change the behaviour and strategies of political parties.
A political vacuum was created as the two main political parties that had contested the Independence election of 1967 formed a coalition in 1969.This was effectively occupied by a radical left wing party (MMM) that embraced a very nationalistic and an ethnic free platform. As it was new and had never participated in an election, nobody could gauge its real electoral force. When the LP/PMSD coalition of 1969 eventually collapsed, the two parties contested the 1976 General Elections
separately. However they had to face the daunting challenge of the MMM. We thus have a unique situation where an election was fought by
three major parties without a pre election coalition. It was the relative uncertainty of the strength of the MMM that led to such a predicament.The election produced a hung parliament with the new party, the MMM,
capturing 34 of the 70 seats. The other two main parties won 36 seats between them ( 28 for the LP and 6 for the PMSD).
Post a Comment